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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Appellants filed two actions in the District Court of 
Cache County, Utah, to set aside and vacate the ,trans-
fer of certain realty and personalty to a sister, Archul-
ius Archibald, and a brother, Wallace Buttars, made by 
their mother Emma G. Buttars, deceased. The cases 
were numbered Civil Case No. 7605 and Civil Case No. 
7607. 
In case 7605 the appellants were the plaintiffs and 
Archulius Archibald was the principal defendant. It was 
to her in that case the transfer of the property was made 
or attempted to be made. The other defendants were 
joined as heirs of Emma G. Buttars, deceased, because 
.they did not desire to be joined as partie's plaintiff. 
In case No. 7607 Appellants were the plaintiffs and 
Wallace Buttars was the principal defendant. It was 
to him the transfers of the estate and personal property 
were made. The othe,r defendants were joined for the 
same reason as mentioned in Civil Case No. 7605. 
In both cases the plaintiffs and defendants consti-
tuted the heirs at law of Emma G. Buttars, deceased. 
She was the grantor and donor. 
In each case the appellants charged that there ex-
iste'd a confidential relationship between Emma G. But-
tars, the grantor, and the grantees, her children, and that 
the transfers were made while the grantor was incom-
petent or mentally and physically infirm and that they 
were induced by undue influence, that the personal prop-
erty was not delivered in the lifetime of the donor. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
On. stipulation the cases were consolidate1d and tried 
together. 
Separate fin1dings of fact, conclusions of law and 
decrees were entered in each case. 
Subsequent to the death of Emma G. Buttars some 
of her grandchildren contested the admitting of her will 
to probate. It waJs entitled Probate file No. 5167. The 
case was appeal~d to the Supreme Court, your file No. 
1945, and this Court sustained the District Court's action 
in setting aside the verdict of the jury who had held that 
Emma G. Buttars was incompetent to make a will. 
In the interest of economy and time it was stipu-
late:d that all of the proceedings, the evidence and ex-
hibits of the will contest was admitted in evidence in the 
trial of the consolidated cases subject to its materiality 
and admissability, and that each of the parties could in-
troduce such evidence as they desired except no further 
evidence would be offered on the question of Emma G. 
Buttars' incompetency except as it was incrdental to the 
evidence being presented. (RR 56, 57). 
In Civil Case No. 7605 wherein Archulius Archibald 
was the principal defendant the trial court entered judg-
ment refusing to vacate the two deeds, U.S. Government 
.bonds in question. However, it decreed that the bank 
stock in que'Stion had not been delivered and that it was 
the property of the appellants and respon<lents subject 
to probate under the terms of the la'st will and testament 
of Emma G~ Buttars. (RR 30-41). 
In Civil Case No. 7607 wherein Wallace Buttars was 
the principal defendant the court refused to vacate the 
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two deeds and go<vernment bonds in question. However, 
it decreed that a joint sa<vings account in the names of 
Wallace Buttars and Emma G. Buttars in the First Se-
curity Bank of Logan in the 'sum of $5,000.00 plus in-
terest was the soie property of the defendant subject to 
the payment of the funeral and last illness expenses of 
Emma G. Buttars. 
In the will contest case the numbering of the record 
wa:s not changed. The proceedings, pleadings and trans-
cript of the consolidated cases began with page 1. In 
the will contest ca:se the pages were numbered 1 to 400 
and in the pleadings and e'Vidence in the two consol-
idated cases are numbered 1 to 239. For the purpose 
of identification when referring to that part of the rec-
ord made in the will contest cruse we will identify it as 
R -------- and the subsequent record as RR ----····· Ci'Vil 
Case No. 7605 is Case No. 8177 and Case No. 7607 is 
Case· No. 8178, in this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FACTS PERTAINING TO BOTH CASES 
Appellants and respondents are the children and 
grandchildren of Daniel Buttars and Emma G. Buttars, 
deceased. All of their married li<ves they were residents 
of Clarkston, a small farming community in Cache 
County. They reared a large family, ten children, and 
accumulated extensi<ve farming interests. Daniel But-
tars died in Clarkston, January 10, 1916 and at the time 
his children were of the following ages: Daniel, 33 years; 
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Margaret, 29 year's; Melvin H., 27 years; Orson M., 24 
years; MaheU, 22 years; Gover, 20 years; Ira, 17 years; 
Hattie, 15 years; Archulius, principal defendant, 12 
years, and Wallace, the other principal defendant, 9 
years. (Ex. 27.) 
Sometime prior to his death the father, Daniel But-
tars, gave and sold to his e~dest sons certain lands a:s 
follows: to Daniel he gave 80 acres and sold him 80 acres; 
to Melvin he gave 80 acres and sold him 80 acres; to 
Orson he gave 80 acres and 'sold him 80 acres; to Gover 
he gave 60 acres; and to Ira he gave 60 acres. (RR 118, 
122). 
He gave no land to any of the daughters in his 
lifetime and none was given to the defendant Wallace 
Buttars, the youngest son. There was a good reason for 
the land gifts to the erder sons. In each in'stance, except 
Wallace, they had worked with their parents and helped 
accumulate the property. The boys were not paid wages, 
only given their food, clothing and spending money. 
The land was given when they married and left home 
except as to Ira and his was given just before his father's 
death. (RR 118, 122). 
The estate of Daniel Buttar's was probated, the 
widow, Emma G. Buttars received her statutory one-
third and the children each received their distributive 
share. Decree of Distribution was entered March 10, 
1917. Daniel, Melvin and Emma G. Buttars were the 
administrators. (Ex. 27). 
Emma G. Buttars never re-married and she and 
her sons Ira and Gover operated the farm for some 
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year's. Ira later married, sold his 60 acres to his bother 
Gover and moved to Burley, Idaho. Gover then operated 
the fa:rm until 1930 when he also moved to Burley anij 
he then sold his 120 acres to his mother, thus adding this 
acreage to her holdings. F·rom 1930 to the date of his 
mother's death on JUly 1, 1952, Wallace operated the 
farm for her on a lease basis. (R 173, 176, 177, 331). 
Emma G. Buttars was 51 years of age when widowed 
in 1916. She never had any serious illness until 1940, 
when she was. 75 years of age. All the testimony is to 
the effect that at all times when she enjoyed good health 
she was 'self-reliant, f·rugal, determined and had a firm 
will of her own. (R 223). Was inclined to be close or 
even stingy and believed everyone should work and earn 
what they got, ( R 201, 215, 226, 292) and, in fact, she 
kept her own holdings intact and added thereto until the 
conveyances and transfers hereinafter mentioned and 
which were made by her after she was 80 years of age 
and 'six days after she made her will in which she stated 
she desired to treat all of her children equally. (R 219). 
Advancing years made their impact on her health. 
In 1940 she had her first serious illness (R 145). She 
was then hospitalized in the Cache Valley Hospital, 
Logan, Utah. She suffered from high blood pressure, 
hardening of the arteries, heart ailment, pneumonia, kid-
ney trouble and thereafter suffered terrible headaches. 
(R. 145, 201, 226). Thereafter she was never the same, 
physically or mentally. This was the testimony of her 
grandchildren who had seen her more or less frequently, 
(R 293) and according to her own children who waited 
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upon her and 'Saw her almost daily or at short intervals. 
(R 168, 201). After this illness from which she never 
fully recovered she continued to deteriorate: physically 
and mentally. (R 185, 186, 201, 203) an!d in 1944 she was 
again seriously ill and hospitalized. (R 203). 
After her first illness in 1940, a serious and obvious 
change came over Emma G. Buttars - her mind con-
tinued to deteriorate. (R 146, 185, 203). She could not 
remember, particularly recent events, even from morn-
ing until later in the day, (R 31, 43, 150, 146, 147, 201, 
203) nor remember her eldest grandson, whom she knew 
best, (R 31, 33, 34, 42, 53) nor their wives. She did not 
realize that her eldest son, Dan, was dead, his death 
occurring February 21, 1945 (R 30-37, 42). A few days 
over a month before the transfers hereinafter mentioned 
were ·commenced, she worried over finances, (R 202, 204, 
190); her mind was confused as to whether she had 
enough to live on when in fact she was well fixed (R 167, 
190) ; she disliked people for no apparent reason, would 
repeat, asking the same thing over and over again, (R 
168, 203); was incoherent and could not stick to a subject, 
(R 228, 157); hid silverware in her bed, (R 202, 227); 
accused some of her children of borrowing money from 
her when they did not (R 227, 229); hid money, couldn't 
distinguish between her own property and others and 
claimed her son's turkeys as her own (R 158); stayed 
in all of the time ( R 228-30). Even the family did not 
want her condition generally known. She did not know 
what she had possessed in the way of property, (R 204-
205, 208), or what she had done or signed away and 
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couldn't handle any amount of money (R 204, 211, 222, 
223, 228) ; purchased a dress to go to the funeral of her 
son Ira, who died in 1949, and then forgot he had died. 
(R 109, 212). She did not know pursuant to arrange-
ments that her son, Wallace, was handling her finances, 
writing her checks, etc. (R 213, 344-50); did not know, 
pursuant to arrangements, that her own daughters were 
being paid by her son Wallace, from her money, for 
taking turns in caring for her. (R 215). 
On July 1, 1918, Dan borrowed $1500.00 from hi's 
mother on his note payable on or before five years after 
date, and at the same time gave her a mortgage· as se-
curity therefor, which was never recorded. (Con. Exs. 
2 and 3). Dan's cancelled check dated January 17, 1923, 
payable to the deceased and upon which 'She had written 
"Paid in full" was produced. (Con. Ex. 1). No one ever 
heard her 'Say Dan owed her money (R 211). She filed 
no claim against D·an's estate. She was always affection-
ate toward Dan, her eldest son, yet one month before 
drawing her will she showed no emotion at his passing. 
(R 211). In her will 'She said she wanted to treat all 
of her children alike, then omitted her son Dan's chil-
dren becau'se she had forgotten he had repaid the loan. 
She said he owed her more than his share of the estate 
would amount to. (Ex. A). 
In 1944, W a1lace and Archulius, the principal de-
fendants, called the family together and a meeting was 
hela at Margaret's place. Margaret, Gover, Melvin, Ar-
chulius and Wallace were present. It was there reported 
by Archulius and Wallace that their mother was not in 
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a condition, physically or mentally, to be left al'one. 
:Melvin sugge~sted appointment of a guardian. It was 
opposed particularly by Wallace who said that he ~ould 
take care of his mother's affairs and that no guardian 
was needed. (R 181, 182, 216, 225, 389, RR 86, 88, 89). 
In 1950 another meeting was calle1d by Wallace and 
Archulius again regarding their mother and at this meet-
ing it was decided the girls woUld take turns caring for 
their mother, be paid for it, and thereafter Wallaee would 
write and sign the checks for the payment of all of his 
mother's obligations. (RR 90-92). 
On March 28, 1945, six days after she made her will, 
in direct contradiction to its express provisions that she 
was treating her family equally, she deeded 60 ·acre's of 
land worth $12,000.00 to Wallace reserving a life estate. 
The conveyance was without consideration. (Def. Ex. 21; 
RR 127, 137, 138). 
Again on January 28, 1947, without consideration 
Mrs. Buttars deeded 48 acres of land to Archulius worth 
approximately $9,600.00, reserving a life estate. (Cont. 
Ex. 22; RR 136, 137, 145). 
On the same date, January 29, 1947, she transferred 
$5,000.00 from her account in the First Security Bank at 
Logan to the First National Bank of Logan and opened 
a j9int ·savings account, without consi'deration, with w al-
lace. (R 366, 367; Con. Ex. 13, Ex. 11). 
On March 3, 1948, she sold to Archulius land worth 
$2,000.00 for $500.00 (Con. Ex. 22; RR 136; R 99, 198). 
Aga:in on May 6, 1948, she gave Wallace, without 
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·consideration, another 60 acre tract of 'land wor.th $12,-
000.00. (Con. Ex. 24; RR 127, 137, 138). 
On the date Mrs. Buttars made her will she had 
about 330 acres of land worth approximately $66,400.00 
and on the date of her death she had about 160 acres 
of land worth about $33,600.00. This included her home 
at Clarkston. The value of the property on the date of 
making her will and the date of the transfers was the 
same at the 1date of her death. (R 194; RR 136, 139). 
When her safety deposit box was opened in the First 
Security Bank at Logan, it contained several instruments 
including U. S. Savings bonds and stock certificates. Of 
the contents of the box she attempted to make the fol-
lowing gifts: to Archulius $1000.00 maturity value U. S. 
Savings bond dated April, 1948, and 22 share'S of First 
Security Corporation stock (since split 4 to 1) worth 
approximately $880.00. Attached to the savings bond 
and stock certificate was a state·ment signed by Mrs. 
Buttars dated April 9, 1945, which sa:id she wa·s making 
this gift because the Clarkston Mill Stock Archulius re-
c·eived from her father's estate had become valueless. 
To her also was three $500.00 maturity value U. S. Sav-
ings Bonds dated April, 1948. (Ex. 7, RR 62; Pl. Ex. 
1-A, RR 72). 
To Hattie, a sister, a $1000.00 maturity value U. S. 
Savings bond dated April, 1948, and 22 shares of First 
Secur'ity Corporation stock (since spJit 4 to 1) worth 
approximately $880.00. Attached to the savings bond and 
stock certificate was a statement signed by Mrs .. Buttars 
dated April 9, 1945, which said she was making this gift 
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because the Clarkston Mill stock Hattie received from 
her father's estate had become valuele'ss. To her also 
was three $500.00 maturity value U. S. Savings bonds 
dated April, 1948. (RR 63, 64; Pl. Ex. 9-A; Ex. 7). 
When their father's estate was probated both Ar-
chulius and Hattie,. sisters, were decreed stock in the 
Clarkston,.Trenton Mill which, alth1ough valuable at the 
time worth approximately $2,640.00 to each, it later 
became vaiueless. (RR 107). 
To Wallace one $100.00 maturity value U. S. Sav-
ings Bond dated December, 1944, one $1,000.00 maturity 
.value U. S. Savings Bond dat~d April; 1948, and a $25.00 
maturity value U. S. Savings Bond date'd April, 1948. 
(RR,63, Ex. 7). 
To a grandson, Milton Buttars, she gave a $500.00 
maturity value and one $50.00 maturity value Savings 
Bonds dated April, 1948. (Cont. Ex. 7). 
All. of these savings bonds were made payable to 
Mrs. Buttars and a joint payee, a's the case may be. 
On the date of her death :Mrs. Buttars ha;d a $9,437.58 
savings account in the First Security Bank at Logan 
and a checking account in the sum of $2,093.64. (R 391). 
~o Wallace she had given or attempted to give prop-
erty worth approximately $30,125.00. (Ex. 7; R. 366, 367; 
Con. Ex. 13; Ex. 11, 127, 138, 137, 136, 145). 
To Archulius she gave or attempted to give prop-
erty worth approximately $12,980.~0. (Ex. 7, 1-A; RR 
62, 72). 
T'o Hattie she gave or attempted to give property 
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worth approximately $3,380.00. (RR 63, 64; Pl. Ex. 9-A, 
Ex. 7). 
She made no gifts to any of her other children in 
her lifetime. 
Had her estate been left :lnta~t a;s intended by the 
will on her death i't would have been worth approximately 
$97,166.22. Instead it had a value of appro~tely 
$45,131.22. 
Although Mrs.. Buttars gave approximately 48 acres 
of land worth about $9,600.00 to Archulius she gave no 
land or other property except that which was found in 
the safe1ty 'deposit box aforementioned to Hattie. (RR 97). 
The execution and delivery of the deeds to both 
Wallace and Archulius and the $5,000.00 savings account 
were made without the knowledge of the other brothers 
and sisters and the family did not learn of the deeds 'to 
Wallace and the savings account until the fall of 1950. 
(R 192, 216, 217, 239; RR 92, 93, 94, 95, 102). However, 
·one of the sisters learned of the deeds to Archulius about 
a year after they were made. (RR 102). Just when Ar-
chulius and Wallace learned of the transfer to ea~h other 
i:s n·ot known. 
In 1951 and 1952, Mrs. Buttars was worried over 
what she had done with her property and asked her 
daughters to straighten out her affairs. (R 237, 238, 255). 
After her husband's death Mrs. Buttars always had 
one of her sons, Gover, Ira or Wallace wi'th her to help 
her transact her business. (R 175, 176, 177). 
The family had complete confidence in Archulius and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
Wallace in their handling of their mother's affairs until 
1950. (R 216, 217). 
Mrs.. Buttars' will was drafted on March 22, 1945, 
by Newel G. Daines, an attorney at Logan, Utah, who was 
recommended to her by Wallace. She was taken to his 
office by him for this purpose although he denied he 
knew she was going to make a will or that she had made 
one. The will was made and executed with the advice of 
the lawyer. (R 381, 382). 
All of appellants' witnesses and the defendant Wal-
lace who stated that 'they never ever heard their mother 
expr~ss any dis'satisfaction with the terms of the said 
Final Decree of Distribution and Partition. 
FACTS PERTAINING PRIMARILY TO ARCHULIUS 
Archulius, after her father's death, when she was 12 
years of age, lived with her mother until her marriage 
in 1921. After that she lived across the street from her. 
(RR 77, 78). 
After 1944 she helped her mother with the keeping 
of the family record book, the buying of neces·sities, gro-
ceries, etc., her mother entrusted her in ~he cashing of 
checks and checks signed by her mother in blank. ( RR 
81, 82). Her mother also entrusted her with the $5,000.00 
·savings deposit book. (RR 85). 
When Mrs. Buttars' safety deposit box was opened 
after her death, there was found a 's:tatement therein 
dated April 9, 1945, signed by her to which was attached 
a $5,000.00 maturity value U. S. Savings Bond and 22 
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shares of First Security Corporation stock (now 88 
shares) worth $880.00. The statement 'said her mother 
was giving her lhe bond and stock because the Clarkston-
Trenton Mill stock which Archulius received from her 
father's estate turned out to be valueless. (R 62, Ex. 
1-A). There were also in the deposit box three $500.00 
maturity value U. S. Savings Bonds in favor of Arohul-
ius. (Ex. 7). In the 'safety deposit box there was also 
found the same amount of stock and bonds for Hattie 
together with a statement to the same effect as that 
attached to Archulius' stock. (Ex. 7; RR 63; Pl. Ex. 9-
9-A). 
On January 29, 1947, Archulius said ·she took her 
mother 'to the office of 0. S. Crockett at which time her 
mother executed a deed giving her approximately 48 
acres of land worth $9,600.00. (RR 98; Ex. 22; RR 136, 
137, 145). 
Her explanation for this gift was that her mother 
told her 'she was giving it to her because her Clarkston-
Trenton Mill stock became valueless. (R 191, 192; RR 
92, 94). 
Both Archulius and her si's'ter Hattie received the 
same amount of mill stock from their father's estate and 
in both cases it became worthless. At the time of the 
distribution it wa;s worth $2,640.00 to each. Hattie was 
not given any land or other property by her mother, 
except the stocks and bonds mentioned. (RR 97). 
On March 3, 1948, Archulius purchased from her 
mother 10.25 acres of land worth $2,000.00 for $500.00. 
She took her mother to the office of 0. S. Crockett, 
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abstra:cter and notary public, who prepared the deeds. 
(Con. Ex. 21, RR 136,99, 198). 
After her mother had transferred $5,000.00 from the 
First Security Bank of Logan to the First National Bank 
of Logan and created a joint savings account with Wal-
lace, Archulius had her mother eliminate Wallace's name 
from the account and took her to Logan to the Fir·s.t 
National Bank for this purpo·se, supervising the act. 
(R 192, 213, 239; RR 93, 94). Subsequently, as herein-
after appears, Walla:ce again triumphed and had his 
mother reinstate his name to the account. 
Archulius said her mother did not read the deed to 
the 48 acres before signing it and that she might just as 
well have had the City Creek property. This consisted 
of about 160 acres and worth $27,800.00. (R 191; RR 136, 
~39) 
Archulius never told any member of 'the family that 
her mother was giving her the 48 acres or se1ling her 
the 10.25 acres prior to or at the time the transfers were 
made and they did not learn of it until the fall of 1950, 
except that one sister, Maybell, wa:s told of it about a 
year after. (R 216, 217; RR 92). 
When Archulius and Maybell were asked by their 
mother to straighten out the me·ss she was in regarding 
her affairs Archulius said to Maybell, "Let's not bother 
her about them." (R 238). 
Archulius and Wallace in 1944 called the family 
together to consider the care of their mother and the 
management of he·r affairs. When her brother Melvin 
suggested the appointment of a guardian to take care 
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of her mother's finances and affairs she and Wallace 
joined with the others in opposing it. (R 181, 182, 216, 
225, 389 ; RR 86, 88, 89). 
Margaret testified that her mother told her, while 
looking thr'ough the window toward the Archibald's that 
she wished they would quit hounding her about her prop-
erty. (RR. 211, 212). 
FACTS PERTAINING PRIMARILY TO 
WALLACE BUTTARS 
Wallace after his marriage lived next door to his 
mother and talked with her twice a day. (R. 368) He 
began to manage and operate her property, approxi-
mately 300 acre·s, on a lease basis, in 1930, and to take 
care of her financial affairs. (R 173, 175, 177, 331, 378). 
He advised her what checks to sign, bil1s to pay, 
and she consul ted him regarding her financial affairs. 
(R. 354, 379, 386). 
They binned their wheat separately until they 
started to gelt government loans. on it and then they 
binned it together and secured their loans jointly. (R 
354). 
He made bank deposits for her and with the assist-
ance of Darrell Crockett made out her income tax re-
turns, and kept in his possession her cancelled che'Cks 
from 1946 'On. He said he didn't keep checks prior to 
1946. (R 366, RR 216). 
He testified that she re1ied on him in the manage-
ment of her affairs and that she had implicit confidence 
in him. (R 379, 380). 
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He advised with her regarding certain legal instru-
ments and recommended that she consult with Newel G. 
Daines, a Logan attorney, regarding her affairs and 
took her to his office for this purpose. However, he 
denied that he knew she made a will and of its provisions 
that she intended to treat her family equally. (R 366, 
381, 382, 387' 399). 
On March 28, 1945, six days after she made her will, 
he took her to Logan to the offi'ce o.f A. B. Crockett, a 
notary publi'c and abstracter, for the making of the deed 
to him of the 60 acres of land worth $12,000.00. (R 127, 
137, 138; Con. Ex. 24; De f. Ex. 21). He 'said his mother 
gave him this property because he did not get anything 
like 'the rest of them got when his dad was alive. (R 383, 
384). 
He claimed that he did not know that his mother 
had 'Created a joint savings account covering $5,000.00 
on January 28, 1947, with him until she told him on the 
way home. However, in reply to a letter from the bank 
to his mother requesting clarification of its records as 
to whether the account was originally intended to be a 
joint account with his,mother he wrote for her signature, 
such was, the case, (Con. Ex. 19 ; R 386, 387, 395, 396), 
and he gave no reason for the $5,000.00 gift. 
His sister Archulius persuaded her mother to take 
his name off the $5,000.00 savings account which she dfd 
and after learning of this he had his mother again in-
clude his name on the account. (R 191, 213, 239; RR 
93, 94). 
On May 6, 1948, he again took his mother to the 
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office of the Crocketts and 0. S. Cro~ke.tt, abstracter and 
Jllotary public, made the deed to the second 60 acre tract 
of land from his mother. He said his mother gaye him 
this becau·se the others got ·sixty or eighty when they 
were 20 to 22 years oJ:d. (R 385). 
The defendant Wa1lace Buttars was 9 years of age 
when his falther died. He had not helped accumulate any 
property and he was not given any by hi's father. (RR 
123). However, after his father's death, his mother, 
Emma G. Buttars, was appointed guardian and from 
the income from the property he received from his fath-
er'·s estate, she, as his guardian, purchased for him a 
tract of 40 acres and a one-half in'te·re'st in another traet 
of 120 a:cres. (RR 129, 130, 131). 
He and his sister Archulius ·called a fami'ly meeting 
in 1944 regarding their mother's health and financial 
affairs and when his brother Melvin suggested the ap-
pointment of a guardian to take care of his mother'·s 
financiaJ. affair's he anij other members of the family 
in'cluding Ar'chulius opposed it and he said he could take 
care of her financial affairs and no guardian was needed. 
(R. 389, 182). And he did manage her financial affairs 
until her de·ath. He said he never did anything on his 
mother's farm or regarding it for whi'ch he was not paid. 
(R 341). 
The Buttars family had confidence in Wallace's 
management of their mother's affairs up until the fall 
of 1950. (R 379 ,380, 216, 217). 
He did not tell any of his brothers or sisters that 
his mother was going to give him either of the two tracts 
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of land or the $5,000.00 savings account. And, except for 
Archulius, they did not learn of it until tile fall of 
1950. (R. 192, 216, 217, 239; RR 92, 93, 94, 95, 102, 211). 
The $5,000.00 savings pass book was not produced 
nor found in the home. {RR 212 to 217). Archulius had 
the keys to her mother's home and after her death when 
the will was read she gave the key to Wall~e. (RR 230). 
ERRORS RELIED ON FOR REVERSAL 
Case No. 8177 
·The Court erred in failing to fin'd that the grantor 
was enfeebled in mind and body; that there existed a 
confidential relationship between her and the defendant 
Archulius. Archibald and that Archulius exercised undue 
influence in procuring the deeds an!d personal property 
in question and in failing to order an aecounlting of the 
rents and profits; and in entering ju'dgment in favor of 
the defendant Archulius Archibald and against the plain-
tiffs; and in decreeing that the defendant Archulius 
Archibald was th~ owner in fee simple of the land cov-
ered by the two deeds 1to her in question and in awarding 
her the United States Government Bonds. 
Case No. 8178 
That the court erred in failing to find that the grantor 
was enfeebled in mind and body; that there exislted a 
confidential relationship between her and the defendant 
Walla:ce Buttars and that the deeds in question, the 
$5,000.00 savings bank account and the government bonds 
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were procured by the defendant Wallace Buttars by undue 
influence, and in failing to order an accounting of the 
rents and profits, and in entering judgment in faV'or of 
the defendant W al1ace Buttars and against the plaintiffs 
and awarding to the defendant Wallace Buttars the prop-
erty covered by the two deeds in question, and any inter-
est whatsover in the $5000.00 savings account together 
with interest. 
QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED 
1. W a!s the grantor Emma G. Buttars enfeebled in mind 
and body at the time of the transaction'S in question¥ 
2. Did there exist between the grantor and the defend-
ants Archulius Archibald and Wallace Buttars a con-
fidential rel~ationship~ 
3. W e·re the gifts the result of undue influence and did 
the grantees discharge their burden of proof and 
establish that the transaction1s were free from over-
reaJching and undue influence~ 
PREFACE TO ARGUMENT 
By way of preface we want it understood that we 
are not here to rehash, criticize or attack the decision 
of this Court In Re: Buttars's Estate 261 P. 2d, 171, the 
Will contest case. The only question presented in that 
case wrus whether Emma G. Buttars had the requisite 
mental capa:city to make a will where in this case the real 
question is whether in light of all the facts and circum-
stances, did Archulius and Wallace procure the property 
in question from their mother by undue influence and 
overreaching. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The law is that where a grantor is enfeebled in mind 
and body or a confidential relationship exists a pre~ 
sumption of invalidity arises that the burden of proof 
shifts and the grantee or donee, must show by clear and 
convincing proof that the transactions were fair, volun-
tarily and free of fraud, undue influence or over-reaching 
and that the grantor had the required mental capacity. 
It is our position that at the time of the conveyances 
and transfers in que'Stion Mrs. Buttars was enfeebled in 
mind and body, that there existed between her and the 
grantees, Archulius and W alla:ce, a confidential relation-
ship. That they took advantage of her condition and this 
relationship and by undue influence persuaded their 
mother to convey to them the property, both real and 
personal, in question. 
MENTAL CONDITION 
At the time of the death of her husband in 1916, 
Emma G. Buttars was 51 years old. Certain of her 
children, Dan, Margaret, Melvin, Maybell, Gover and 
Orson were all married, while Ira, Hattie, Archulius and 
Wallace were still at home. Emma G. Buttars, Dan and 
Melvin were appointed administrators of the estate of 
Daniel Buttars, deceased, and on March 10, 1917, Decree 
of Final Distribution and Partition was entered by the 
Di'strict Court of Cache County in which the Court adopted 
the plan proposed by the three administrators. After the 
death of the father Mrs. Buttars, Gover and Ira took over 
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the active management and operation of the farm. Ira 
later married, sold his 60 a:cres to Gover and moved to 
Burley, Idaho. Gover operated the farm until1930 when 
he moved to Burley, Idaho, and sold his 120 acres to his 
mother, thus increasing her hoidings by this acreage. 
From 1930 to the date of the 'death of his mother, Wallace 
has operated the farm pursuant to the terms of certain 
leases. 
Gover ·and Ira remained in Burley, where Ira died 
in 1949. Melvin lived at Cornish and Dan at Lewiston, 
Utah. Both of them always made frequent trips to Clark-
ston to visit their mother. Melvin's wife was a Clarkston 
girl, so he made frequent trips to see his mother-in-law 
and mother, also. Hattie married, moved to Burley and 
later to Garland. W a:llace married and built a horne just 
a few rods from where his mother lived. Archulius lived 
a;crolss the ·street. Mayben and Margaret both lived in 
Clarkston, close to their mother's home. Family ties were 
strong and they a!ll visited back and forth frequently. The 
record shows that the grandchildren, the children of Dan, 
also upon o1ccasion more or less frequently, visited with 
their grandmother. 
AU of the evidence is also to the effect that Emma 
G. Buttai"s was a lady of resolute will, inclined to be very 
frugal and saving in her disposition, and habits, and that 
she enjoyed good health until the year 1940 and that from 
the time of the death of her husband in 1916 until the 
many conveyances and transfers made by her beginning 
with the year 1945, she not only made none but that she 
in~crea:sed her holdings by purchasing an additional 120 
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acre trarc't of land from her son Gover, besides the money 
in the banks, the bonds herein mentioned and the First 
Security Bank Stock. The re·cord is also cle:ar that up 
until the year 1940 the deceased always enjoyed good 
health and that th·ereafter she was never the same strong 
and healthy individual nor di'd she transact any business. 
The Buttars family was a united one until the fall of 
1950. The children visited with their mother and Wallace 
continued to operate her farm on a share basis. No one 
interfered. The record is silent as to any quarrel ever 
between the mother and any of her children. 
In 1940 Emma G. Buttars was 75 years old. She 
became seriously ill and thereafter wa:s never the same. 
About everything was wrong with her. She suffered 
from hardening of the arteries, high blood pressure, heart 
ailment, kidney trouble, and terrific headaches. Deterior-
ation had set in. Every indication of senility was and 
remained appare·nt. She couldn't remember recent events, 
from morning until later in the day. She didn't recognize 
some of her eidest grandsons, nor their wives. One month 
before she made her will, she didn't realize her son, Dan, 
had died nor could she remember or carry on coherent 
conversations. She worried over finances wlien she in 
fact had plenty. Her mind was confused over finances 
and property particularly and she con·stantly worried 
about having enough to live on. She was forgetful, 
particularly as to recent events, disliked people for no 
reason at all, would repeat, ask the same thing over and 
over again, hide 'silve·rware in bed, accuse some of her 
children of borrowing from her when they liad not, hide 
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money, 'Couldn't distinguish between her own property 
and that of her sorrs. She didn't know what she had or 
possessed in the way of property or what she had done 
or signed away. There was no doubt mental deterioration 
had taken pl.ace. Her condition became so bad that the 
family didn't want her condition generaHy known. Long 
before 1945 deceased failed to attend to any of her own 
business affairs. All 'She did was to sign checks and follow 
Wallace or be led around by him. ( Tr. 360). 
In late summer or early fall of 1944 W atlace and 
Archulius called the family together and it was there 
reported that their mother was not physicaily or mental-
ly in a condition to be left alone. The appointment of 
a guardian was suggested. Before her will was made she 
did not know that pursuant to an arrangement Wallace. 
was caring for her finances, nor that thereafter in 1951 
and 1952, her daughters were taking turns in caring fo~ 
her and we:re being pa:i!d therefor. After returning from 
the hospital following her first illness her daughters 
cared for her without pay. She ~lso had a second serious 
illness in 1944. Such is the positive testimony of appel-
lants and respondents. 
Tho:se of the appellants' witnesses who te'stified are 
all gr&wn person:s, 40 years of age or thereabouts, all 
of whom were intimately acquainted with the deceased 
during her lifetime, knew of her physicai and menta'l con-
dition earlier in her life, and each of them visited with 
their grandmother at different intervals after her illnes's 
in 1940, and so were competent witnesses. 
When she made her will she declared that she was 
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treating all of her chi'ldren equally, and then omitted 
her deceased son Dan's children upon the mistaken belief 
that he had not repaid a loan, whi'le he had, several years 
before, and then sold property worth $2,000.00 for $500.00 
to Archulius. 
We contend that in view of the foregoing fructs the 
grantor was enfeebled in body and in mind and the bur-
den was upon the grantees to show mental condition and 
that 'the trans·action wa:s fair and free of undue influence. 
Less degre:e of proof is required to estab'lish mental 
irrcapacity and undue influence in the ca;se of an en-·. 
feebled grantor. 
In Kadogan v. Booker, 66 SE 2d 297, 302 (W. Va.) 
the court said : 
"Less evidence is required to estabiish in-
competency when a grantor is aged and enfeebled 
in mind and body." 
And when a grantor sells property for an inade-
quacy of consideration, although not conclusive evidence 
of incompetency, it is persuasive. 
Here we have a sale by Mrs. Buttars of land worth 
$2,000.00 for $500.00. 
In 26 O.J.S. Deeds, Sec. 54, page 268, it says: 
"Inadequacy of ·consideration is persuasive, 
a:lthough not conclusive, evidence of mental in-
capacity, and where mental weakness and inade-
quacy of consideration co-exist they may together 
furnish ground for invalidating a deed." 
And where a grantor is enfeeb'led in mind and body 
a presumption of invalidity arises and 'the grantees must 
overcome the presumption and show that the transaction 
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was fair and free of undue influence and that the grantor 
had the reqursite mental capacity. 
In Johnson v. Reese, 249 SW 2d 538, (Ky.) the 
grantor when 87 years old executed a deed in favor of 
his daughter and her husband who were living with him. 
He was enfeebled and needed someone to take care of 
him. Short'ly before the grantees moved in with him 
some of his children consulted an attorney regarding 
having a committee appointed to handie his estate. The 
daughter knew this. The court said: 
"In view of the relationship between the par-
ties, the age and physical condition of the grantor, 
we think the burden was upon appe'llants to prove 
the transaction was voluntarily entered into and 
fully comprehended by him." 
In Morris v. Williams-Garrison, 128 S.E. 78, 99 W. 
Va. 140, the grantor was 63 years old, sub-nonnal, a 
moron, and someone always helped him manage hi'S af-
fairs. The court S1aid : 
"The defendant has signally failed to over-
come the presumption of incapacity, which arises 
from the mental weakness of the grantor, the ab-
sence of consideration for the conveyance, and the 
other circumstances of this case." 
In Johnson v. Johnson, 191 N. W. 353, 196, Iowa, 343, 
the grantor executed a deed in favor of his wife on Sep-
tember 29, 1919, while in the hospital, he was 80 years old, 
had been taken to the hospita:l on the 1st of September 
in a coma, W 1as operated on on September 6. There was 
a dispute as to his mental condition after the operation, 
plaintiffs claiming he did not change and the defendants' 
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witnesses claiming that it cleared up. As to the burden 
of proof the, court said: 
"In view of the undisputed mental incapacity 
of the decedent at a stage of his illness prior to 
the execution of the deed, the plaintiffs made 
a prima facie case and the burden was thereby 
cast upon the defendant to show the restoration 
prior to September 29; and, in view of the deced-
ent's undoubted weakened condition, both mental 
and physical, and of his own he'lples'sness and utter 
dependence upon his wife to provide for him, she 
must be deemed as the dominant personality and 
as fiduciary at least for the time being. The bur-
den was therefore cast upon the defendant to 
show, not only the mental caprucity of decedent, 
but also that the ex~cution of the deed wa:s not 
the result of the stress of undue influence exer-
cised upon him in his helplessness." 
The supreme court of New Mexico in Morgarn v. 
Thompson, 127 P. 2d 1037, states the ru1e thus: 
"Finally, in the case of a reaJl mental weak-
ness, ~a pre'sumption arises against the validity 
of the transaction, and the burden of proof rests 
upon the party claiming the benefit of the con-
veyance or contract to show its perfect fairness 
and the capacity of the other party." 
II. 
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
The evidence is conclusive that there existed a con-
fidential relationship between Emma G. Buttars and her 
children A rchulius and Wall ace, at the time the trans-
fers or attempted transfers were made. 
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ARCHULIUS ARCHIBALD 
Archulius was the ninth child of Emma G. Buttars, 
12 ye1ars of age when her father died in 1916, and she 
lived with her mother until she married in 1921, after 
whrch she: lived across the street. She talked with her 
mother daily, was in her mother's home or her mother 
was in her home each day, except when she was away for 
a few days ~at a time. 
After her mother became seriously itl for the second 
time in 1944 (the first time was 1940) she helped her 
mother with her sewing, with the family record book, 
bought her mother's grocerie's and necessities and helped 
manage her home generally. Her mother entrusted her 
with checks signed in blank and in the cashing of che'cks 
and the custody of 1a $5000.00 savings deposit book. 
She exercised such influence and dominance over 
her mother that she persuaded her to remove W ailace's 
name from the $5000 savings account, took her mother 
to Logan where 'she supervised the removal of his name 
from the account only to be defeated in this when w~anace 
again persuaded his mother to reinstate him; and her 
mother reposed such implicit confidence in her and she 
exercised such dominance over her mother that her 
mother sold her land worth $2000 for $500. 
Archulius agreed that all of the foregoing facts were 
true except that she would have us believe that she did 
not advise with her mother in regard to the removal of 
Wallace's name from the savings account although she 
does admit she took her mother to Logan to accomplish 
this purpose and was present with her mother at the 
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bank when it was done. 
These fa:cts under the authorities establish that a 
confidential relationship existed between them; particu-
larly is this true in the light of her mother's physical and 
menta1 condition. 
WALLACE BUTTARS 
W a;l'lace Buttars was the tenth and last child of 
Emma G. Buttars. He was nine years of age when his 
rather died. He lived with her until his marriage and 
then next door. 
After Mrs. Buttars' husband's death in 1916, Gover 
and Ira rented her farm and one of them always assisted 
her in the C!onduct of her affairs. In 1930 Wallace began to 
operated her farm on a lease basis. Thereafter he assisted 
her in the management of her affairs until her death. 
Over the years he talked with her twice daily. She ad-
vised with him and he says relied upon him explicitly, ad-
vised with her on practically :all matters pertaining to 
financial affairs, made out her income tax returns, told 
her of financial obligations and what biils. to pay, co-
mingled his grain with hers and ·secured joint government 
loans, advised her as to what lawyer she should consult, 
his lawyer, regarding her affairs. 
In 1944 at a family meeting which he and Archulius 
called to eonsider their mother's condition 1and affairs, 
he objected to his brother Melvin's suggestion that a 
guardian be appointed to look after his mother's financial 
affairs, saying that h€ ·cou'ld and would look after them 
and that a guardian was not needed. 
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Under these facts can there be any question but that 
a confidential relationship existed between Emma But-
tars and Wallace during the time of the transactions in 
question~ 
There is no question but that both Archuiius and 
Wallace occupied a confidential relationship with their 
mother-that her physical and mental condition required 
·in the later years of her life she confide and advise with 
someone. These two were the natural persons to assmne 
suGh relationship. 
Appellants sustained their burden and established 
such a relationship as a matter of fact and law. 
In determining whether a confident~al relationship 
exists the Court, among other things, takes into consid-
eration the experience and business affairs of the grantor, 
her age, physical and mental condition, whether there 
exists a disparity in the mental qualities of the grantor 
and grantee, and the confidence reposed. The relation-
ship need not be legal, may be either moral, social, do-
mestrc or merely personal. 
In Fisher v. Burgiel, 46 NE 2d, 380, 385 (Il'L) the 
grantor wa.s 77 ye·ars old, mentally ill, he had been friend-
ly with Mary Burgi~l,. for 35 years, they lived next door 
for about 22 years. Anthony Burgiel di'd odd jobs for 
her. About a year before the deeds were made she spent 
part of her time with them in their home for which they 
were paid. From January 1938 to August, 1939, she made 
withdrawals from bank with checks written in Mrs. Bur-
giel's handwriting and signed by her. The Court said: 
"It is settled law that Courts of equity will 
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not set any bounds to the facts and circumstances 
out of which a fiduciary relationship may spring. 
A fiduciary relationship with its legal incidents 
indudes not only aU legal and technical relations 
such as guardian, and ward, attorney and 'Client, 
prirrcipa;I ~and agent, and the like, but it extends 
to every possible case in which a fiduciary rela-
tionship exists in fact, and in which there is confi-
dence reposed on one side and resulting domina-
tion and influence on the other. * * * The relation-
ship need not be legal but it may be either moral, 
social, domestic, or merely personal." 
In Mead v. Gilbert, 185 A. 668, 693, (Maryland) the 
grantor was between 70 and 80 years old, seriously ill 
when the deeds were made. Son took over and had been 
managing his mother's affairs. The Court said: 
"The question comes finally to this that where 
a conveyance from a parent to a child is attacked, 
the existence of a confidential relationship be-
tween the parties is a fact to be ·shown, as in any 
other case where it is not presumed as a matter 
of law. (U pman v. Thomey, Supra), and that in 
such an inquiry advanced age, physical debility, 
and mental feebleness are all facts, not one of 
whrch is necessary conclusive, but any one of 
which may have weight in determining whether 
the re~lationship as a fact existed." 
In Woolwine v. Bryant, 54 N.W. 2nd 759 (Iowa) the 
grantor turned to the grantee when her husband died, 
the grantee accompanied her when she left home, ran her 
errands, purchased her supplies, coUected the rentals 
from the farm and deposited them in the bank, cared for 
the leasing of her farm and had a right to write checks 
on her ~account. The court said: 
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"That equity takes cognizance of transactions 
between parties occupying a fiduciary or confi-
dential relationship, and will grant relief where 
such relationship has been abused, is well recog-
nized. A confidential r~lationship is said to exist 
where one has gained the confidence, of another 
and purports to act or advise· with the other's in-
terest in mind. Where such a confidential rela-
tionship is found to exist between 'a grantor and a 
grantee a presumption against the validity." 
In Longmire v. Kruger, 251 P. 6.92, (Calif.) the 
Court said: 
"Unquestionably this is the rule of equity, 
·and a deed of conveyance from a parent to a child 
is not presumed to be inVJalid. Indeed, without 
further facts, just the contrary is true, and such 
a deed is presumed to be valid. 3 Thompson on 
Real property, 1052, sec. 2886; 2 Pomero;y's Equ-
ity Jur. (.4th Ed.) 2076, sec. 962. But when the 
parent is aged, infirm, or otherwise in a condi-
tion of dependency upon the child, who exercises 
authority over him, a presumption arises which 
pla·ce:S the burden upon the beneficiary of the 
gift conveyance, to show the transaction was fair 
and free from fraud. Equity will scrutinize such 
a transaction with great care, and, under such 
circumstances, s'light evidence will suffice upon 
which to base a finding of undue influence and 
set aside the deed." 
And your Court in Omega Investment Com-
pany v. Woolley, et al, 72 Utah 474, 271 P. 797, quotes 
with approval the following language from 2 Pomeroy, 
Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 956, as follows: 
"Wherever two persons stand in such a rela-
tion that, while it continues, confidence is neces-
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sarily reposed hy one, and the influence which na-
turally grows out of tha;t confidence is possessed 
by the other, and this ·confidence is ~abused, or the 
influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the 
expense of the confiding party, the person so 
availing himself of his position will not be per-
mitted to retain the advantage, although the trans-
action could not have been impeached if no such 
confidential relation had existed. Courts of equity 
have careful'ly refrained from defining the par-
ticul,ar instances of fiduciary relations in such 
manner that other and perhaps new cases might 
be excluded. It is settled by an overwhelming 
weight of authority that the prilnciple extends to 
every possible case in which a fiduciary relation 
exists as a fact, in which there is confidence re-
posed on on.e side, and the resulting superiority 
and influence on the other. The relation and the 
duties involved in it need not be legal; it may 
be mor.al, social, domestic, or merely personal." 
(Italics added.) 
III. 
And where there exists a confidential relationship, 
such as existed here, a presumption arises that the trans-
actions were invalid and the burden shifts to the grantee 
to overcome the presumption and show that the transac-
tions were fair and free of overreaching or u-ndue in-
fluence; and the grantor's mental capacity. 
The rule is wel'l stated in Omega Investment Com-
pany v. Woolley, et al, 72 U. 474,488,271 P. 797, the court 
said: 
"Thus, in tr'ansactions between persons occu-
pying such relations, in which the stronger or 
superior party obtains a benefit or advantage, 
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fraud is presumed, and the burden is cast upon 
the superior party to show fairness, adequacy, 
~and equity in the transa~tion." Peterson v. Budge, 
35 u. 695, 102 p. 211. 
And the burden is upon the grantee to show by clear 
and convincing proof that the transactions were fair and 
free of fraud or undue influence, and that the grantor 
had the necessary mental capacity. 
The rule is stated in Hayes v. Thornsbrough, et al, 
69 P. 2d 664, 667, 180 Okl. 357. The court said: 
"The defendant occupied the dominant posi-
tion in the relation, and once it is established., the 
transaction in which he obtained ~a deed from 
plaintiff is presumptively fraudulent. The defend-
ant is, therefore, under the burden of showing by 
clear and convincing evidence that there has been 
no abuse of the confidence, and that he has acted 
in good faith and that the transaction was per-
fectly fair ·and supported by adequate considera-
tion." 
In the case of Fuson, et al v. Fuson, 57 S.W. 2d 42, 
43, 24 7 Ky. 380, the court said: 
"But where the parties involved occupy a con-
fidential relationship toward ea:ch other, and the 
consideration is not fixed in amount, but is wholly 
undetermined, dependent upon future events ren-
dering its efficacy problematical, then the burden 
is cast upon the beneficiaries of the contract 
(grantees in a deed) to show by clear and convinc-
ing proof that the. transaction was fair ·and free 
from the taint of any undue influence, overreach-
ing or fraud." 
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IV. 
LACK OF INDEPENDENT ADVICE 
Although there is authority that the lack of inde-
pendent advice, where a confidential relationship exists, 
or the gra.ntor is mentally infirm in and of itself is not 
grownds to set aside a conveyance, but is to be consid-
ered with all other circumstances, the better rule is and 
the one adhered to by this court that where the grantor 
did not ha.ve independent advice, this lacking if fatal to 
the transaction an,d the transfers both real and personal 
will be set aside. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that the grantor, 
Mrs. Buttars, even though she was 80 years of 'age and 
more, and if not mentally incompetent, was both men-
tally and physically enfeebled, had any independent 
advice regarding the transa'ctions in question. In con-
trast to this when she made her will she was closete·q 
with an attorney alone, received independent advice and 
exercised her free will and as a result attempted to pro-
vide in her will her intention that all of her children and 
the children of her deceased children should be treated 
equally. Wallace and Archulius both maintain that they 
dtd not know of this provision in their mO'ther's will and 
Archulius that she did not know that her mother had 
attempted to give her stocks and bonds to recompense 
her for the mill sto1ck received from her father's estate, 
which became valueles·s. This is unworthy of belief. 
Wallace took his mother to a lawyer of his choice in the 
making of her will. He and Archulius were their mother's 
advisers and they talked with her daily. Then, instead 
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of taking their mother to a lawyer or other person where 
she might get independent a:dvice and .exercise her free 
will they took her to abstractors and notary publics to 
have her legal papers executed, the deeds, where they 
could supervise the transactions, see that it was done in 
keeping with their wishes and under their influen'ce and 
dominance and n'ot in the free exercise of her will. 
The Supreme Court of thi's State in Omega Invest-
ment Compamy v. Woolley, et al, 72 U. 474, 490, 271 P. 
797, laid down the rule that it was the duty of the person 
accepting the conveyance to see that the grantor ha:d 
disinterested advice and full information. The Court 
S'aid: 
"Whenever there exists between parties con-
fidence on the one hand and influence on the other, 
from whatever cause they may spring, equity re-
quires in all dealings between them the highest de-
gree of good faith on the part of him in whom the 
confidence is reposed. If a conveyance is executed 
by the other in his favor, the burden rests upon 
him to prove that lt was not procured by means 
of such confidence and influence. It is his duty, 
before accepting the conveyance, to see that the 
grantor has disinterested advice and full informa-
tion." 
In Ham v. Ham, 110 So. 583, 146 Miss. 161, the court 
said: 
"The usual method of proving independent 
consent and action in such cases, and probably 
the on'ly way it can be clearly proven, is by show-
ing that in making the deed the grantor acted on 
the a:dvice of a competent person, disconnected 
from the grantee and devoted wholly to the grant-
or''S interest." 
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And in Beals v. Ares, 185 P. 780, 795, (N.M.) the 
Supreme Court of New Mexi~co, in a case involving a con-
fidential relationship said: 
"I take it to be a well-established principle of 
this court that persons standing in confidential 
relations towards others cannot entitle themselves 
to hold benefits which those, others may have 
conferred upon them, unless they can show to the 
satisfaction of the court that the persons by whom 
the benefits have been 'conferred had competent 
and independent advi'ce in conferring them. This, 
in my opinion, is a settled general principle of the 
court, and I do not think that either the age or 
the capacity of the person conferring the benefit 
or the nature of the benefit conferred affects the 
principle. Age and 'Capacity are considerations 
which may be of great importance in cases in 
which the principle does not apply; but I think 
they are but of little, if any, importance in cases 
to which the principle is applicable. They may af-
ford a sufficient protection in ordinary cases, but 
they can afford but little protection in cases of 
influence founded upon confidence." 
Thus on this principle alone, independent of the other 
evidence in the case which shows the exercise of undue 
influence and overreaching on the part of Wallace But-
tars and Archulius, the court should set aside the trans-
actions in question, the two deeds, $5,000.00 savings ac-
count and the bonds to Wallace and the 2 deeds and the 
U. S. Savings bonds to Archulius. 
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v. 
The evidence established that the transfers and gifts 
of personalty were the results of over-reachinJg and undue 
influence. 
We contend that because the grantor-donor did not 
have any independent advice regarding the conveyances 
and gifts of personalty in question they should be set 
aside and vacated. However, it is not necessary that we 
stop here, for the evidence unquestionably establishes that 
both Wallace and Archulius secured tlieir deeds and the 
personal property by overreaching and undue influence 
and in any event .they did not overcome the presumption 
of invalidity and establish by clear and convincing proof 
that the 'transfers were fair and not the result of undue 
influence. 
Undue influence can rarely be proved by diree;t evi-
dence and usually it is shown by circumstantial evidence. 
In determining whether overreaching or undue influence 
existed, or when the burden of proof shifts, the lack of 
undue influence, the courts, among other things, take into 
consideration the age, mental and physical condition of 
the grantor, opportunity for overreaching, the activity 
and interest of the grantee in bringing about the execu-
tion, of the instruments, the secrecys surrounding them, 
divergence of the results n·orma1ly to be expected, pre-
vious declarations of the grantor inconsistent with the 
results accomplished, improbability of the rea;son given 
for the transfers and lack of independent advice. All 
of these lan'dmarks and others are present here. 
The evidence proved, and we shall not set it forth 
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again, that the grantor was enfeebled in mind and body 
and in such a condition that she could easily be imposed 
upon not only because of lier enfeebled condition but as 
there existed a confidential relationship between her 
and Wal'lace and Archulius. They had the opportunity 
to overreach her. They were her confidants and advisors, 
and as such they talked with her daily. 
WALLACE 
It is undisputed that in 1944 Wallace and Archulius 
called a family meeting because of their mother's condi-
tion to 'dis'cuss and decide what should be done with 
regard to her, and, although it was recognized that she 
needed heip, they and others opposed the appointment 
of a guardian. It was this decision that laid the founda-
tion of what was to folloiW. 
On March 22, 1945, Mrs. Buttars made her will by 
an attorney recommended by Wa:llace and with the aid 
of independent advice and in the exercise of her free, will 
solemnly deC'lared that it was her intention to treat all 
of her children and the children of her decea:sed children 
equally, an'd this would have been accomplished except 
that be'cause of her mental condition she had forgotten 
that her son Dan had repaid the money that he had bor-
rowed from her several years before. 
In direct contradiction of this provision in he!r will 
six days later ~she began to deed her property away and to 
prefer Wallace for on March 28, 1945, she deeded him 
60 acres 'of land worth about $12,000.00. Wallace main-
tain's that he did not know that his mo'ther had made a 
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will, or that in it she provided for her children equally1 
although he ·said he knew of the intended execution of 
the deelds and he recommended that she go to the lawye1r 
who made the will and took her to his office and then 
called for her after the will was made. Is this to be 
believe'd 1 It is revealing that instead of taking the grant-
or back to the lawyer who drafted the will six days be-
fore or some othe~r attorney or other person where she 
could and woul'd receive independent advice regarding 
the adv~sability of the transfer, Wallace took her to an 
abstractor and notary public who drafted the deed for 
her signature. 
Wallace says his mother told him the reason for this 
gift was that he didn't get what his brothers got when 
his father was alive. How does this square with the facts? 
It is true that prior to his father's death in considera-
tion of his eider sons working on the farm and helping 
him acquire his holdings, that he gave either 60 or 80 
acres of land to 1:hem. He also permitted three of them 
to buy other lands. The gifts were given on the b'o;ys' 
marriages except as to Ira, who received his when 17 
years old as his father did not expect to live long. There 
was a good reason for his father and mother not giving 
any land to Wallace. He· was only 9 years of age when his 
father died and had in no way helped his father and 
mother in creating the estate and Wallace was, at the age 
of 9, to inherit from his father property which, unlike 
the others, he hald not helped accumulate. There is no 
merit to this alleged reason and it is further borne out 
by the undisputed facts that his mother as his guardian 
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with money earned from the property he had inherited at 
the age of 9 purchased 40 acres of wheat land and a one-
ha:lf interest in 120 acre tract of land, part of whi'ch was 
subsequently broken up and became wheat producing. 
Wallace, by the time he married had property equal 
to or in excess of that given to his brothers plus that 
inherited by them. 
Thus no ineqUities existed that required his mother 
to give him 60 acres of land. Thl.s is further borne orut 
when you take into consideration that since 1930 Wallace 
had the use and benefit on a lease basis of 300 acres of 
his mother's land. So, the reason he gives for this gift 
mus~t fal'l of its own weight when considering the l'ight 
of these facts and circumstances 
This property was deeded without the knowledge of 
his brothers and sisters in secrecy. He did not tell any of 
them of the intende'd transfers and, except as to Archu-
lius, they did not learn of it until 1950 at which time 
he says the family lo'st confidence in him. 
The next giH to Wallace is the $5000.00 jo'int savings 
account on January 29, 1947. This was the same day 
that his mother gave Archulius her 48 acres of land. 
It wouid thus appear that when Archulius learned of 
the conveyance of the 60 acres of land to Wallace (the 
first 60 to Wallace) she concluded that if Wallace was to 
be preferred by her mother she could likewise benefit 
and she put into execution her plan to persuade her 
mother to give her property, and in doing this she would 
work with Wallace when her interest p,rofited by it, and 
Wallace accepted her as a jo!int conspirator when it was 
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to his interests. It is not entirely clear who took Mrs. 
Buttars to Logan when the deed of the 48 acres of land 
to Archulius and the $5,000.00 joint tenancy savings ac-
count was created, as Archulius says she took her there 
and W allaee says he took her home. In regards to the 
$5,000.00 savings a;ccount Wallace says he did not know 
that his mother was going to make him this gift until she 
to'ld him on the way home. Wallace gave no reason for 
this gift. Apparently, there was none, he could not justi-
fy it and the only conclusion that can be reached is that 
it was due to overreaching and undue influence. 
It is apparent that Wallace and Archulius not only 
worked together when it se·rved their interests but they 
worked separately and at times attempted to nullify each 
others efforts. Thl.s is a fair inference from the evidence. 
She was to get the 48 acres and in so doing he was to in-
crease his holdings by the $5,000.00 savings account. In 
acc~mplishing their purpose they were prepared to work 
together and then repent at leisure. So Archulius, after 
getting her gift of the 48 acres, persuaded her mother to 
take Wallace's name off the joint savings acc·ount, took 
her to Logan and supervised the accomplishment of this 
only to be defeated when Wallace learned of it and he 
again had his mothe:r create a joint tenancy in the savings 
account. These transactions were also 'Secret and not 
known to the rest of the family until the fall of 1950 ex-
cept that Mayben learned of Archulius' gift ab'out a year 
after it was made. In the light of these facts were not 
these gifts the result of overreaching and undue influ-
ence? 
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That Wallace was overreaching his aged and 
enfeebled mother according to a plan is borne out by 
the fact that again on May 6, 1948, he had his mother 
deed him another 60 acres worth about $12,000.00. Again 
this was done without the knowledge of the family and 
he took his mother to an abstractor and notary pub-
lic at Logan who made the deeds, not to an attorney or 
other person where she could get independent advice. 
Now listen to the reason for this conveyance-his mother 
gave it to him because ·the other boys were given 60 or 80 
acres when they were 20 or 22 years old and they were 
permitted to buy another 60 or 80. This, like the reason 
given for the first 60 must fall of its own weight, for the 
reasons heretofore mentioned in discussing W aUace's at-
tempted justification for his mother giving him the first 
60 acres, and for the further reason that neither Gover 
or Ira had the opportunity to purchase any land, and 
none of the other boys except Ira and Gover were per-
mitted for over 20 years to lease 300 acres of their 
mother's Iarrd. If this is reason to be believed we ask 
why did not his mother convey him this 60 acres when 
she conveyed the first on March 28, 1945. If the reason 
existed in 1948 it likewise existed in 1945. Why didn't 
she give him both sixtie·s on March 28, 1945 ¥ Why wait¥ 
We submit that this is fabrication pure and simple and 
is not entitled to any serious consideration. 
In addition to the three gifts above mentioned 'total-
ling approximately $29,000.00 his mother also attempted 
to give him $1125.00 maturity value in government bonds. 
These were found when the safety de'posit box was open-
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ed. Wallace claimed he had no knowledge that these 
gifts were made or intende'd. To this we merely say that 
in View of ail of the facts in this case and considering 
that he was his mother's adviser, talked with her twice 
a day and then stated to Maybell that when his mother's 
safety bo~ was opened "there'd be hell a-poppin," is this 
to be believed~ 
I· 
It is readily apparent that Mrs. Buttars' physical 
and mental con'dition was enfeebled and that she was in a 
condition to be taken advantage of by her children 
regardless of ~whether they occupied a position of trust 
and confidence and that two of them on recognizing this 
fact, that is Archulius and Wallace, did so; that she was 
imposed upon is further borne out by the fact that some-
time between 1950 and her death she tol'd her daughter 
Margaret and on other occasions her daughters Maybeil 
and Arch uli us her affairs were· in a me·ss, she didn't 
know what she had done with her property and asked 
that they straighten them out. 
The mere fact tha.t the deeds contained the reten-
tion of a life estate is of no particular significance, as if. 
Mrs. Buttars intended to prefer Wallace and Archulius, 
she could have done so in her will. 
It is also of some significance that Wallace knew 
before the execution of his deeds that they were to be 
made, that he disclaims any knowledge whatsoever that 
he knew his mother was going to make a will or that she 
had made one. 
lf Wal'lace was not overreaching his aged and en-
feebled mother why all the secrecy surrounding the trans-
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actions? Why did he not take the rest of the family in his 
confidence or at 1eas·t make arrangements for her to ge:t 
independent advice from some person who had her in-
terests in mind. 
It was established by dear and convincing proof' 
that Wallace overreached and secured the gifts in ques-
tion from the exercise of undue influence and in any 
event he did not discharge his burden of proof, overcome 
the presumption of invalidity, and show by clear and con-
vincing proof that the gifts were not the· results of un-
fairness, overreaching or undue influence. 
ARCHULIUS 
It should be kept in mind that Emma G. Buttars 
,.. and her husband did not treat their daughters the same 
as they did their sons. When Mr. Buttars was alive, upon 
the marriage of his sons, as mentioned before, he gave 
each of them 60 or 80 acres of land, but none to his 
daughters. There were four giris in the family. Mar-
garet and Maybell married prior to their father's death. 
Among the assets of their father's estate were sever-
al shares of Clarkston-Trenton Mill Stock, some of which 
was distributed to Archulius and Hattie, having a value 
of $2640.00 to eaeh. This stock at this time was con-
sidered a good investment. However, within a few years 
it became valueless. 
When the safety deposit box was opened besides 
the $1125.00 maturity value bonds to WaHace and $550.00 
maturity value bonds to a grandson, there was found that 
Mrs. Buttars had attempted to give one $1,000.00 rna-
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turity value and three $500.00 maturity value bonds and 
22 shares of First Security Corporation stock to Archu-
lius and the same to Hattie. Attached to the $1,000.00 
bonds and ~stock certificates in each instance was a state-
ment that because the Clarkston-Trenton Mill stock had 
become worthless this gift _was being made to them. The 
statement was dated April 9, 1945, or 16 days after the 
date of the will. 
Archulius maintained that she didn't know of these 
attempted gifts nor the reason therefor until the safety 
deposit box was opened. Is this to be believed if her 
statement is true that every year her mother said she 
was going to make it up to her because the stock had be-
come worthiess ~ 
On January 29, 1947, Archulius said she took her 
mother to Logan ; this was the same date of the alleged 
$5,000.00 joint tenancy gift in favor of Wallace, and to 
the o:ffice of an a~stractor and notary public who pre-
pared the de'ed for her mother's signature giving her 48 
acres of land worth about $9600.00. The deed was given 
without the knowledge of the other mem·bers of the 
family except, undoubtedly, W a:llace, and they did not 
learn of it until the fall of 1950 at the service station 
meeting. However, there is some evidence that Maybell 
learned 'Of it about a year after it was made. 
Archulius said her mother gave her this property, 
the 48 acres, because the Clarkston-Trenton Mill Stock 
became worthless. This was the same reason her mother 
gave in 1945 for giving her and her sister Hattie each a 
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$1,000.00 bon.d and 22 shares of First Security Bank 
stock. 
Now 'let's examine this reason and see if it he be-
lieved in the light of all the facts and circumstances. 
We have before pointed out that this gift of 48 
acres was accomplished the same day as the gift of the 
$5,000.00 savings account to Wallace and although Archu-' 
lius says she took her to Logan to the office of Mr.· 
Crockett, an abstractor and notary public, who prepared 
the deed, it would appear from the evidence that she was 
either accompanied by Wallace or met him in 'town, as he 
says he took his mother home on January 29, 1947, and 
then first learned of the $5,000.00 gift. It must be con-
cluded then that they were engaged in a common pur-· 
pose, that is, she was to get the 48 acres provided Wallace 
got the $5,000.00 gift. 
In all likelihood Archulius learned that Wallace had 
secured the 60 acres from his mother and she decided 
that if he was to so benefit, she would likewise pre-
vail upon her mother and secure a preference for her-
self. Thus, she enlisted the help of Wallace (probably 
under the threat of exposure) and he joined with her in 
accomplishing this purpose with the understanding that 
in so doing he was to get the $5000.00 savings account. 
This concession she was willing to give and she either 
acquiesced 'in it without reservation, or she decided at a 
later date that Wallace was and had secured a dispro-
portionate amount from her mother. In line with this 
she prevailed upon her mother to terminate the joint 
tenancy, only to have Wallace at a later date again have 
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his name reinstated on the savings account as a joint 
tenant. Does this point to anything except that they were 
overreaching their mother and using her as pawn to be 
moved about as they willed~ 
Then when confronted by her brothers. and sisters 
regarding her taking advantage of her mother, she had to 
have some reason and the only one she could think of that 
might have some basis was that it was given to her be-
cause of the mill stock. In so doing she could expJain 
this away by saying that she didn't kno·w that her mother 
had theretofore made an attempt to reimburse her for 
this loss. An additional fallacy in this, and one which 
clearly shows the falseness of her reason; is that she and 
her sister Hattie had both received the same amount of 
mill stock. Hattie's likewise became worthless and yet 
her mother did not give her 48 acres or any other prop-
erties except, orf course, the bond and shares of stock 
which Archulius had likewise received. If her mother 
believed any inequities existed that should be remedied 
with reference to the mill stock, she had already taken 
care of this and Hattie was included in the program. If 
she was to get 48 acres because of the mill stock this 
reason existed on April 9, 1945, when her mother gave the 
stock and bonds for the same reason. Why not transfer 
then or a prorvision made in the will~ 
In line with this it should be kept in mind that the 
grantor realized that •she had been taken advantage of. 
However, she did not know how, as sometime between 
1950 and her death she asked her daughter Margaret and 
again her daughters Maybell and Archulius to straighten 
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out the mess she was in at which time Archulius said, 
"Let's not bother her." What didn't Archulius want 
brought to light~ And again Archulius told her sister 
Maybell that her mother did not even read the deed and 
she just as well had the City Creek property. The City 
Creek property was 160 acres. 
That Archulius was, as well as Wallace, pursuing a 
program of taking advantage of their aged and en-
feebled mother is further borne out by the fact that she 
purchased from her mother a tract of land worth $2,-
000.00 for $500.00. Her mother relied upon her in the 
fairness of the transaction. 
If Archulius was not taking advantage of her mother 
why all the secrecy concerning the transactions~ Why 
did she not take her other brothers and sisters into confi-
dence and advise them that her mother was making these 
conveyances to her~ The least she could have done was 
to see that her mother secured independent advice re-
garding the advisability regarding them. 
The record is free from any evidence that would 
justify Wallace and Archulius in their course of conduct 
and in procuring over forty percent of their mother's 
estate to the detriment of their brothers and sisters and 
the children of their deceased brothers. 
Another factor to be considered is that while Mrs. 
Buttars was well physically and mentally she kept her 
estate intact and it was not until she ha:d deteriorated 
both physically and mentally that these two children 
were able to secure these preferences. Not only this, 
but as we have pointed out had their mother intended 
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to make a preference she could have done so in her will. 
In view of the foregoing we contend that the evi-
dence established by clear and convincing proof that W al-
lace and Archulius secured the gifts in question upon 
the exercise of undue influence and in any event neither 
of them diS'charged their burden of proof overcoming the 
presumption of invalidity. 
We have before pointed out that although some 
courts hold that the lack of independent advice is a factor 
to be considered in the light of all the evidence that courts 
have held and such appears to be the holding orf this 
Court in Omeg.a Investment Company v. Woolley, et al, 
72 U. 474, 271 P. 797, that the only way that presump-
tion of invalidity can be overcome is by showing that the 
grantor had independent advice. 
We recognize that each case must stand upon its 
own facts, that rarely will the facts of one case be the 
same as another. However, we believe that the followillg 
cases should be helpful to the Court in determining 
whether the transactions were the result of overreaching 
and undue influence and whether Wallace and Archulius 
discharged the burden of proof in overcoming invalidity 
of the gifts. 
In Woolwine v. Bryant, 54 N.W. 2d 759 (Iowa) the 
Court said: 
"While no actual fraud or direct evidence of 
undue influence appears in the record, we think 
the answer to the case is well stated in the words 
of the late Justice Evans, who in Johnston v. 
Johnston, 196 Iowa 343, 348, 191 NW 353, 355 
stated: 'It is a rare case when the dominant indi-
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vidual in a fiduciary relationship can sustain a 
gift to himself by one who is dependent upon 
him.''' 
In the case of Fuson v. Fuson, 57 EW 2, (Ky.), the 
father brought an action to ·cancel a deed to two sons 
because of undue influence in which he retained a life 
estate. He was 72 years of age, had recently moved in 
with one of the grantees, was deaf and had impaired 
vision. He had recently been sick and was depressed 
over his wife's recent death. His sons were to run the 
farm and take care of him. In securing their father's 
signature to the deed, they studiously failed to mention 
the transactron to any of the grantor's other children. 
The court said : 
"Without further discussion we unhesitating-
ly conclude, not only that defendants failed to dis-
charge the burden cast upon them by the rule·, 
supra, growing out of the confidential relationship 
to their father, the grantor, but the evidence fur-
thermore convinces us that he was actually over-
reached and procured to execute the deed in con-
troversy contrary to his oft-expressed desires 
that all of his children should share equally in his 
property, and which he would not have done but 
for the chicanery and undue influence practiced 
upon him by the defendants. It is true, as we 
have heretofore intimated, that no one expressly 
testified to any such influencing facts; but the 
circumstances detailed in the testimony, the facts 
gleaned from the statements made by the defend-
ants, plus their evident reluctance by their "not 
remembering" are all most persuasive that the 
attached deed was not understandably executed 
by plaintiff, nor were the result of his free and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
52 
untrampled will, all of which is ·sustained by the 
testimony." 
In Bentley vs. Bentley, 119 A. 253 (Maryland) the 
grantor when 78 years old gave a deed of trust in favor 
of her brother Frank reserving a life estate. The need 
of a guardian was discussed by Frank with his brothe·r 
Ben, who was excluded, but nothing came of it. She was 
feeble and needed assistance. Did not feel good towards 
her brother Ben. Frank claimed that his sister called 
him wanting to know what she could do to keep her 
brother Ben from disposing of everything on the place. 
He suggested the appointment of a trustee. F'rank 
claimed he did not know that he was to be the beneficiary 
until sometime after it was done although he took her to 
the home of the draftsman for the execution of the deed. 
He did not disclose to his relatives that his sister had 
given him the property. The trust deed was set aside. 
The Court said: 
" 'It is not inconsistent with the exercise of 
undue influence or artifice that the instrument 
assailed was executed voluntarily and with a 
knowledge of its contents.' 
" 'The question is not whethe·r she knew what 
she was doing, had done, or proposed to do, but 
how the intention was produced; whether all that 
care and providence was placed around her as 
against those who advised her, which from their 
situation and relation with respect to her, they 
were bound to exert in her behalf.' " 
In Myrick vs. Bruetsch, 56 P. 2, 591 (Cal.) the court 
set aside a. conveyance wherein the grantor granted a 
joint tenancy with himself and a daughter. He could 
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not read or write English, one of the defendants was 
always present when he did any business. The defend-
ant lived with her father and the conveyance was made 
shortly after her mother's death, the papers were pre-
pared by a notary public, and the grantor had no inde-
pendent advice. Defendant said nothing to her other 
brothers and sisters about the transfer until some time 
r: after their father's death. She talked disparagingly 
about her brothers and sisters and discouraged them 
i. 
i-
from visiting with their father. The father expressed 
affection for all of his children and could not under-
stand why they did not come often. The grantee went 
with her father to the notary public on each occasion 
when anything was done in connection with the making 
of the conveyance. The father had said he was going 
to equally divide his property among his children. 
In Overstreet v. Beadles, 101 P. 2d, 874, the Court 
set aside two deeds, one made in December, 1927, and 
the other in October, 1930. After the deeds were made 
they were placed in the grantor's strong box. In the 
spring of 1930 or 1931 the grantee went to the bank, 
the banker brought the two deeds from the bank, went 
to the home of the grantor, handed her the deeds and 
in his presence she handed them to her son the grantee, 
saying that he could do whatever he de·sired with them. 
She told him to take thein and that this land would he 
enough to keep him. The Court in setting aside the 
deeds said: 
"The record is completely void of evidence 
that Mrs. Mary A. Beadles had independent ad-
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vice at the time the challenged deeds were dated. 
Touching the deed to the Overton land, she prob-
ably had nothing to do with its making. After 
that deed had remained in darkness for ten 
years, it was brought to light just long enough 
to be recorded, and then it was conveniently 'lost' 
so that the grantor's signature could not be 
scrutinized. And in respect to the deed to the 
Creek land the testimony of the scrivener and 
of the notary contributed nothing from which it 
· might be deduced that the grantor had the bene-
fit o:f independent advice in the transaction which 
led to its execution or to dispense with its neces-
sity. 
In Legler vs. Legler, 211 P. 2d 233, 247, the Su-
preme Court of Oregon, in setting aside a deed, said: 
"This court has held that more mental ca-
pacity is required to engage in a transaction in-
volving the execution and delivery of a deed than 
to write a will. Gilliam v. Schoen, 176 Or. 356, 
157 P. 2d. 682, and Miller v. Jeffery, 129 Or. 674, 
278 P. 946. 'Generally, a grantor, unlike a testa-
tor, must cope· with another party to the trans-
action, that is, with a grantee. He must be able 
to look out for himself concerning such matters 
as consideration, warranty and terms of sale. 
When a deed, like the present one, is testamentary 
:in character, it might seem that no more mental 
capacity should be required of the grantor than 
if he executed a will. But deeds, even though tes-
tamentary in nature, unlike wills, are not revoc-
able. They afford no opportunity for giving effect 
to afterthoughts. ' 
And the Court again said: 
The deed came forth, in our opinion from 
a transaction in· which the appellant partidipated 
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under circumstances which demanded an explana-
tion. F·or instance, there was the element of se-
crecy. So far as we know, there was no ill feeling 
between the appellant and the respondents, nor 
was there any ill will of which we are aware be-
tween the appellant and Mr. Mattson, the tenant. 
The secrecy provokes suspicion. The execution 
of the deed constituted almost a complete about-
face from previous plans which Mr. Legler had 
long entertained and which he had mentioned to 
people even outside of the family circle. In fact, 
it involved the disposition of his most valuable 
asset, not by a will as he had contemplated for 
many years, but by a deed." 
In Tracey et al vs. Tracey, 163 At. 80 (Maryland) 
the court set forth as landmarks of undue influence to 
be considered in the light of all of the evidence the 
following: 
"Landmarks of undue influence are: Diverg-
ence of results accomplished from those which 
would ordinarily be expected; effect of grant on 
grantor; substantial and manifest conflict be-
tween deed and purpose of grantor; previous 
declarations o:f grantor inconsistent with results 
accomplished; marked activity and interest by 
beneficiaries in bringing about execution of in-
strument; and sometimes absence of reasonable 
opportunity to secure independent advice from 
disinterested sources." 
Also see the following cases: 
In Re McConkey's Estate, 92 P. 2d, 456 
Longmire v. Kruger, 251 P. 692 
O'Grady v. O'Grady, 18 P. 2d 373 
Sparks v. Mendoza, 189 P. 2d 43 
Brown v. Hilleary, 286 P. 593 
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Flowers v. Flowers, 221 P. 483 
Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n vs. 
Crawford, 160 P. 2d 169. 
As we have pointed out, Archulius in the purchase 
of 10.25 acres of land on March 3, 1948, paid only the 
sum of $500.00 for land worth $2,000.00. Inadequacy of 
consideration in itself is evidence of undue influence. In 
26 C. J. S. Deeds~ Sec. 82, p. 294, it says: 
"Inadequacy of consideration will be consid-
ered on the issue of undue ·influence and may 
combine with opportunity for the exercise of un-
due influence to show such influence invalidating 
a deed." 
and in 9 Am. J ur. Cancellation of Instruments, Sec. 25, 
p. 371, it says: · 
"* * * Inadequacy of consideration for a con-
tract or conveyance may, hoiWever, be sufficiently 
gross to he cle·arly indicative of ·imposition or 
undue influence, and where coupled ·with weakness 
of mind, from whatever cause produced, or with 
. pecuniary distress, or circumstances of fraud, 
oppression, or undue influence, affords a· proper 
case for relief in equity." 
In Halloran-Judge & Trust Company vs. Carr, et a~ 
62 U 10, 218 P. 139, the court declared further that where 
the consideration for a deed is so inadequate as to shock 
the conscience of the court it will be set aside for this 
reason alone. 
. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we respectfully submit: 
That the evidence is clear that respondent Archulius 
Archibald exercised undue influence and overreached her 
I 
I 
) 
' I 
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mother, and wrongfully induced her to convey to her the· 
property described in the two deeds and the government 
bonds, and that in any event she did not overcome the 
presumption of their invalidity and establish by clear 
and convincing proof that they were not the result of 
undue influence and overreaching; and the trial court 
erred in refusing to vacate and set aside the deeds and 
decreeing that the property described therein and the 
government bonds were the property of appellants and 
respondents subject to the conditions of the last will and 
testament of Emma G. Buttars and in failing to direct 
an accounting of the rents and profits of the lands sub-
ject to her right to set-off in the sum of $500.00 paid by 
her for the 10.25 acres. 
That the evidence is clear that Wallace Buttars exer-
cised undue influence and overreached his mother and 
wrongfully induced her to convey to him the property 
described in the two deeds in question, the $5,000.00 sav-
ings account and the $1125.00 government bonds and 
that in any event he did not over come the presumption 
of invalidity and establish by clear and convincing proof 
that they were not the result of undue influence and over-
reaching; and that the trial court erred in refusing to 
vacate and set aside the deeds and decreeing that the 
property described therein and the $5,000.00 savings ac-
count and $1125.00 was the property of appellants and 
respondents subject to the conditions of the last will and 
testament of Emma G. Buttars and in failing to direct an 
account of the rents and profits of the lands subject to 
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the terms of the leases thereon ·since the death of his 
mother on July 1, 1952. 
And this court should enter judgment directing cor-
rection of the errors above mentioned. 
Appellants pray for such other relief as may be just 
and equitable and costs. 
Respectfully ·submitted, 
L. DELOS DAINES 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
GEORGE C. HEINRICH, 
Logan, Utah 
.Attorneys for Appellants. 
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